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**Supplement
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Libya: Qadhafi's New Activism in the Caribbean

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Libya's determination to expand its involvement in the Caribbean has resulted in new ties to the military regime in Suriname and to proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean departments, but the rejection by English-speaking Caribbean leftists of Libyan calls for violence in pursuit of political objectives will limit Qadhafi's influence.

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South Yemen: Prospects for Political Instability

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Political rivals in Aden are positioning themselves for the crucial Yemeni Socialist Party congress in October, and the prospect of further violent confrontations between South Yemeni factions is on the rise and could easily get out of hand.

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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors,

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Libya: Qadhafi's New Activism in the Caribbean

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Libya's determination to expand its involvement in the Caribbean has resulted in new ties to the military regime in Suriname and to proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean departments. Libyan support probably would improve the capabilities of French Caribbean separatists for militant action and provide opportunities for Tripoli to establish a limited regional base of operations in Paramaribo. On the other hand, the rejection by English-speaking Caribbean leftists of Libyan calls for violence in pursuit of political objectives will limit Qadhafi's influence.

Background

Qadhafi's immediate objectives are to undermine US and French interests in the region. Qadhafi regards the United States and, to a lesser extent, France as the principal impediments to achieving his broader leadership aims in the Third World, including the Caribbean.

At the root of Qadhafi's involvement lies his increasing determination to undermine US policies in what he refers to as Washington's "backyard." In a major policy speech last September, Qadhafi explicitly linked Libya's aggressive posture in Latin America to what he claims are threats to his regime from US naval operations in the central

Mediterranean

Qadhafi is targeting French interests in the Caribbean because he is bitter over what he regards as continuing French "imperialism" in Africa.

Libya's new activism in the Caribbean was presaged by Qadhafi's decision last fall to put Musa Kusa—one of his most radical advisers—in charge of Libya's Latin American activities. Kusa heads the International Center for Revolution (ICR), an organization created by Qadhafi in late 1983 to spread his personal philosophies of revolution, promote cooperation among radical groups worldwide as well as Libya's influence in radical circles, and coordinate Libyan financial aid and paramilitary and terrorist training for regional dissidents. The ICR

subsumes the Libyan organization traditionally charged with maintaining contacts with Caribbean leftists—the "Third World Center for Resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, and Reaction," founded in 1982.

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Libyan Tactics

Kusa's ICR has developed a Caribbean program combining intelligence gathering; use of financial aid, intimidation, indoctrination, and propaganda; exploitation of regional Muslims; and economic involvement as tools of political influence:

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- Kusa and his principal deputy, Mukhtar Quannas, have met with key eastern Caribbean leftist leaders at least twice since fall. The Libyans have been impatient with the reliance of leftist leaders on local electoral processes to achieve political objectives. Instead, Tripoli has urged them to adopt a militant approach. To this end, senior Libyan officials have pressed leftist leaders to send members of their organizations to Libya for subversive training.

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- The Libyans are urging Caribbean leftists to adopt Qadhafi's revolutionary philosophies as blueprints for action. senior Libyan officials demanded last year that regional leftists undergo ideological training to expand their political consciousness and gain power. Libya also is working to create local political organizations modeled on Qadhafi's revolutionary system in Libya. The Libyan People's Bureau in Caracas last year promoted the establishment of five small "people's congresses" in Venezuela.

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- Tripoli is working to gain influence among Caribbean Muslims to promote its anti-Western policies. [redacted]
Libya arranged and funded the Third Caribbean Islamic Conference in Curacao in April. Libyan participants pushed for a public condemnation of Western influence in the region, according to the US Consul General in Curacao. Tripoli recently also established a branch of its Islamic Call Society in Curacao and wants to set up an Islamic Call Society office in Suriname. We believe Tripoli intends to use its Islamic Call societies as channels for financial handouts to dissidents in the region and to identify and recruit subversives.

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- [redacted] Libya is interested in establishing a Caribbean newspaper to spread its radical views and attack US and French policies.
- Libya is considering expanding its economic activity in the area. Libyan officials inquired about purchasing a recently closed oil refinery in Netherlands Antilles, [redacted]
[redacted] Tripoli also wants to open a bank in the Caribbean. [redacted]

Libya's aggressive activities are accompanied by an effort to establish regional bases of operation. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Libya's cultivation of Suriname is intended to gain even more freedom to operate in Paramaribo [redacted]

[redacted]

Despite its broad economic and military promises, Tripoli anticipates expanding relations slowly to test Surinamese leader Bouterse's commitment to revolution. [redacted]

[redacted]

Bouterse, in turn, is suspicious of Qadhafi, partly because he fears that foreign activities in Suriname could help local radicals to threaten his power. In addition, Bouterse's key military advisers oppose Libyan military assistance, and Bouterse probably is wary of directly antagonizing Washington. Still, we believe the Surinamese leader would cooperate with the Libyans in nonviolent regional activities in return for sufficient financial inducements. Bouterse, therefore, is likely to continue courting Tripoli until he finds other sources of foreign assistance to alleviate Suriname's financial problems. [redacted]

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The Regional Threat

[redacted] Qadhafi so far has made only limited progress in expanding his regional influence. Libya's traditional clients—leftist leaders from the English-speaking islands of St. Lucia, Dominica, and Antigua—are [redacted] willing only to pay lipservice to Qadhafi's ideology to gain financial handouts. These leftists have resisted Libyan demands for violent action because of concerns that such activities would damage their political standing and risk government retaliation. Moreover, many English-speaking Caribbean leftists are trying to broaden their appeal by minimizing radical rhetoric and forming alliances with political moderates. [redacted]

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We believe senior Libyan officials are making some compromises in their dealings with English-speaking leftists because they recognize that increased pressure to adopt a militant approach would further alienate them. [redacted] Tripoli is temporarily toning down its calls for violent action to concentrate on building its assets in the region. [redacted]

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We believe the failure of the Libyans to persuade English-speaking leftists to adopt militant tactics has fueled Qadhafi's determination to make contact with proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean

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Libya's Expanding Relations With Suriname

The opening of a Libyan People's Bureau in Paramaribo last February marked the beginning of growing ties between the two countries. Surinamese Army Commander Desire Bouterse and senior government officials signed economic cooperation agreements during their visit to Tripoli in March that could eventually total \$100 million. Tripoli agreed to buy Surinamese agricultural products and to consider oil exploration and industrial development projects.

[redacted] the Libyans are courting the Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (UPLG), the most active non-Marxist proindependence group in the Caribbean departments. Despite public condemnation by the UPLG of several terrorist bombings over the last two years, local authorities believe that the terrorists belong to a clandestine wing of the Union.

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Shortly after meeting with senior Libyan officials in Tripoli last March, UPLG leaders held a conference in Guadeloupe of groups seeking independence from France.

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Since the conference in Guadeloupe, UPLG leaders have visited Barbados to improve contacts with several groups, including leftists, students, labor, and ruling party leaders.

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Outlook

Libya's aggressive policies in the Caribbean will continue to meet with mixed results, in our view. Potential Libyan supporters almost certainly will continue to be alienated by heavyhanded Libyan efforts to impose Qadhafi's radical ideology. In addition, Libyan influence will be constrained by geographic distance and cultural insensitivity toward the region. Tripoli also is likely to encounter local government opposition to its efforts to expand economic and cultural activities in the Caribbean.

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departments over the last several months. Radical groups in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana have demonstrated a willingness to use violence to pursue their political objectives. Moreover, the French separatists appear to have the political commitment, organization, capability, weapons, and terrorist knowledge lacking among English-speaking leftists in the region.

We believe that Libyan frustration with the English-speaking leftists' continuing poor electoral prospects almost certainly will prompt renewed calls by Tripoli

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for more militant action. A resumption of heavyhanded Libyan pressure will antagonize English-speaking leftists and strain relations. [redacted]

A less likely scenario is that Qadhafi and his advisers will continue to soft-pedal their calls for increased militancy by English-speaking leftists. Diminished Libyan pressure on English-speaking leftists for violent action would encourage them to continue providing Tripoli with regional assessments and information as well as entree to local leftists. [redacted]

Moreover, Tripoli's tactical shift, if sustained, would reduce some strains in its relations with Havana. Cuba's advice to English-speaking leftists to pursue moderation, which is intended to help strengthen their popular support, until recently conflicted with Libyan calls for increased militancy. More compatible policies, however, are unlikely to prompt coordination of the two countries' support for regional leftists. Qadhafi's and Castro's personal rivalry and disdain for each other's revolutionary philosophies lie at the root of longstanding mutual suspicions. [redacted]

French Antilleans oppose independence, and only a few local leftists openly support terrorist tactics. Moreover, increasing evidence of Libyan efforts to destabilize the French departments is likely to prompt a crackdown by French security authorities. According to [redacted] the US Embassy in Paramaribo, Western governments, including the French, are particularly concerned that Libyan involvement in Suriname will lead to military support for radical separatists in French Guiana. [redacted]

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Libya has better prospects for inciting violence in the French-speaking areas. We believe Qadhafi will increasingly focus attention on radical French Caribbean groups because of their willingness to use more militant tactics. Moreover, Qadhafi perhaps believes that successful terrorist operations by proindependence French-speaking radicals will encourage English-speaking leftists in the Caribbean to use similar tactics. [redacted]

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Because French separatists have little hope of achieving independence through the political process, their increasing desperation may drive some to use more militant action. Libyan support would amplify the separatists' capabilities for violence and further undermine stability, but it probably would not lead to an early solution to the independence issue. Most

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South Yemen: Prospects for Political Instability

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Political rivals in Aden are positioning themselves for the crucial Yemeni Socialist Party congress in October, and the prospect of further violent confrontation between South Yemeni factions is on the rise. President Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani achieved a commanding lead in the recent basic party elections, and he hopes to use that support to oust his rivals during the party congress. Ali Nasir's competitors, who believe he may be strong enough to succeed, have little to lose by provoking a confrontation. [redacted] in late

May clashes occurred between supporters of Ali Nasir and his rivals that included assassination and coup attempts. Although Western diplomats indicate that the recent incidents probably were intended to remind Ali Nasir that his rivals will not easily give up their positions and did not represent a serious bid to seize power, further conflict appears likely and could easily get out of hand. [redacted]

The Cauldron Boils

Ali Nasir's victory in the basic party elections has strengthened the perception among his rivals that he will have the political strength to oust them at the party congress in October. As a result, we believe that they may be thinking about getting him first. Western diplomats and knowledgeable observers suggest that the rivals at least want to convince Ali Nasir that he must take their interests into account before the party congress. According to this view, the clashes in May were designed to demonstrate a capability to defend their positions outside of party channels. [redacted]

Ali Nasir's ideologically disparate rivals have attacked both his foreign and economic policies. They claim that efforts to normalize relations with Oman and the ending of support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the National Democratic Front insurgents of North Yemen have not produced anticipated increases in foreign aid from the Arab Gulf states. Ali Nasir's opponents also blame him for Aden's poor economic performance and call for a return to a more socialist-oriented system. [redacted]

[redacted] Ali Nasir's rivals have been armed and have joined forces to oppose him. One of the rival groups attempted to seize the state radio station in Aden in late May, according to Western diplomats. In response, Ali Nasir supporters from his Shabwa governorate stronghold have been transported to Aden. Both factions have attempted to assassinate their opponents. [redacted]

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Soviet backing for Ali Nasir, a crucial element in Aden's internal politics, may be wavering. His appeals to Moscow for support brought only the response that the growing confrontation was an "internal problem,"

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[redacted] Nevertheless, we believe that Soviet officials prefer Ali Nasir to his rivals. Moscow's apparently lukewarm support could be intended to warn him against a further expansion of contacts with the West, an outgrowth of his efforts to improve Aden's economy. In our view, Moscow is not likely to take an active role in South Yemeni domestic politics unless political violence jeopardizes its interests in Aden. [redacted]

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Outlook

Because the stakes are high for both sides and the issues that sparked the infighting have not been resolved, we believe that further militant posturing is likely and could easily get out of hand before the party congress. Ali Nasir stands a better-than-even chance of emerging victorious from a confrontation, largely because he has more assets in the state security, government, and party bureaucracies. His rivals, however, have substantial support in the armed forces and could use their military backers to try to remove Ali Nasir. [redacted]

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Although Ali Nasir has arranged difficult political compromises in the past, he probably will not be able to fashion an agreement that protects his recent party gains while reassuring his rivals that he will not oust them. Instead, he could try other tactics, such as having the party discipline Ali Shayi Hadi—who attempted to seize the radio station—and making a

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The Rivals



Ali Antar

Politburo member, former Deputy Prime Minister, former Defense Minister, opportunistic, Ali Nasir's chief rival.

political deal with the relatively pragmatic Salih Muslih Qasim. Even then, however, Ali Nasir would still have to deal with opposition from Ali Antar and Abd al-Fattah Ismail.

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Implications for the United States

If Ali Nasir prevails, we would expect him to continue his moderate foreign policies and his efforts to improve Aden's economy. He probably would continue to look to the West and the moderate Arabs for economic aid.

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Salih Muslih Qasim

Politburo member, Defense Minister, opportunistic but pragmatic enough to deal with Hasani.

If his rivals prevail, Aden may return to its former policy of exporting revolution in the Arabian Peninsula. Both Antar and Ismail supported subversion in North Yemen in the past, and, under them, military clashes with North Yemen near the Marib oilfields would be more likely. Antar or Ismail could be expected to promote closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. Antar agreed to the establishment of Soviet bases in South Yemen during Soviet Admiral Gorshkov's visit to Aden in 1983—a development we believe Ali Nasir has long opposed. Ismail's links to Moscow were well developed even before the USSR granted him exile when he was ousted from power in 1980.

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Abd al-Fattah Ismail

Former President, former party secretary general, ousted in 1980 coup, member of Central Committee general secretariat, hardline pro-Moscow ideologue.

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No photo available

Ali Shayi Hadi

Politburo member, chairman of Higher Party Control Committee, probably backing Antar.

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